Home-Rule Municipalities and Public Lands: Disposal of Public Lands as a Matter of Local Concern by Hygh, Angela
Denver Law Review Forum 
Volume 95 Article 12 
2-15-2018 
Home-Rule Municipalities and Public Lands: Disposal of Public 
Lands as a Matter of Local Concern 
Angela Hygh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlrforum 
Recommended Citation 
Angela Hygh, Home-Rule Municipalities and Public Lands: Disposal of Public Lands as a Matter of Local 
Concern, 95 Denv. L. Rev. F. (2018), available at https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2018/
2/15/home-rule-municipalities-and-public-lands-disposal-of-public.html?rq=home-rule%20municipalities 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review Forum by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, 
please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
58 
HOME-RULE MUNICIPALITIES AND PUBLIC LANDS: 
DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC LANDS AS A MATTER OF LOCAL 
CONCERN 
INTRODUCTION 
The safety, preservation, and management of public lands, including 
parks, has become a matter of increasing concern since President Donald 
Trump decreased the size of multiple national monuments.1 Within Colo-
rado, the Conservation in the West Poll revealed that 75% of voters in 
2018 consider themselves to be conservationists, up from 65% in 2016.2 
In the same poll, 53% of Colorado voters also indicated that they opposed 
privatizing the management of services provided at national public lands.3 
Colorado state law protects public parks owned by Colorado municipali-
ties with C.R.S. § 31-15-713, which requires an election to approve the 
sale of any such public park.4 However, a recent case before the Colorado 
Court of Appeals has raised the question of whether home-rule municipal-
ities in Colorado may avoid the election requirement and dispose of park 
lands in accordance with their own ordinances.5 This Article will argue 
that the local ordinances addressing the disposition of land owned by home 
rule municipalities should supersede C.R.S. § 31-15-713. 
I. STRAWBERRY FIELDS: IS AN ELECTION REQUIRED BEFORE COLORADO 
SPRINGS MAY TRADE A PUBLIC PARK TO A PRIVATE ENTITY? 
A. Background 
In 2016, the Colorado Springs City Council voted to trade the Straw-
berry Fields open space and a parking lot to the private entity The Broad-
moor in exchange for about 400 acres of other “wilderness” property, ease-
ments for trails, and other property.6 The Broadmoor agreed to use nine 
acres of the 189-acre Strawberry Fields property for a picnic pavilion and 
  
 1. Michelle Baran, After Bear Ears Reduction, Tour Operators Worry that National Parks Are 
Vulnerable, TRAVEL WKLY. (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Tour-Opera-
tors/After-Bears-Ears-reduction-tour-operators-worried-that-national-parks-vulnerable. 
 2. COLORADO COLLEGE, 2018 WESTERN STATES SURVEY 19 (2018), https://www.colora-
docollege.edu/other/stateoftherockies/conservationinthewest/2018/reports/2018WesternStates_Inter-
viewSchedule_Colorado.pdf. 
 3. Id. at 10. 
 4. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-713(1)(a) (2017). 
 5. Pam Zubeck, Update: Strawberry Fields Case Argued Before the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals, COLO. SPRINGS INDEP.: THE WIRE (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:03 PM), 
https://www.csindy.com/TheWire/archives/2018/01/09/strawberry-fields-case-argued-before-the-
colorado-court-of-appeals [hereinafter Update]. 
 6. Pam Zubeck, Land Swap Approved by 6-3 Vote, COLO. SPRINGS INDEP.: THE WIRE (May 
24, 2016, 7:55 PM), https://www.csindy.com/IndyBlog/archives/2016/05/24/land-swap-approved-by-
6-3-vote [hereinafter Land Swap Approved]. 
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a stable but to leave the rest open for public use.7 The City of Colorado 
Springs (hereinafter the City) states in its Charter that it has the power to 
acquire and dispose of real property.8 In its ordinances and Procedure 
Manual for the Acquisition and Disposition of Real Property Interests, the 
City describes the procedure for disposing of real property and does not 
require an election.9 
Opponents of the Strawberry Fields trade formed nonprofit Save 
Cheyenne, which sued the City in state court arguing, inter alia, that C.R.S. 
§ 31-15-713 forbade the City from disposing of the Strawberry Fields open 
space without an election.10 However, the district court ruled in the City’s 
favor in December 2016.11 On appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Save Cheyenne argues that the district court erred in concluding that the 
land trade was a matter of local concern and that C.R.S. § 31-15-317 thus 
does not apply to the trade.12  
B. Home-rule ordinances supersede conflicting state statutes in matters 
of local concern 
To prevail on their claim, Save Cheyenne must show that the state 
statute applies to the City. Article XX, Section 6 of the Colorado constitu-
tion states that Colorado statues only apply to home-rule municipalities as 
long as the charter or ordinance of the home-rule municipalities does not 
supersede state law.13 The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that when 
a Colorado statute and a home-rule ordinance conflict over a matter of 
“local concern,” the home-rule ordinance supersedes the Colorado stat-
ute.14 However, when the Colorado statute and home-rule ordinance con-
flict over a matter of “statewide concern” or of “mixed state and local con-
cern,” the state law supersedes the ordinance.15 Thus, the question of 
which law supersedes the other depends on the determination of whether 
the matter at issue is of local concern, mixed state and local concern, or 
statewide concern.16 
  
 7. Id. 
 8. COLO. SPRINGS, COLO., THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF COLO. SPRINGS, § 1-20(b) (2017). 
 9. See COLO. SPRINGS, COLO., CITY CODE, § 7.7.1804 (2017); CITY OF COLO. SPRINGS, 
PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE ACQUISITION AND DISPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS 18–22 
(2016), https://coloradosprings.gov/sites/default/files/res-web_version_real_estate_manual_4-26-
16.pdf. 
 10. Update, supra note 5. 
 11. Pam Zubeck, Strawberry Fields Argument Filed with Appellate Court, COLO. SPRINGS 
INDEP.: THE WIRE (Jun. 6, 2017, 5:47 PM), https://www.csindy.com/TheWire/ar-
chives/2017/06/06/strawberry-fields-argument-filed-with-appellate-court. 
 12. See Opening Brief at 34–35, Save Cheyenne v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 17CA0043 (Colo. 
App. May 27, 2017). 
 13. COLO. CONST. art XX, § 6. 
 14. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 579 (Colo. 2016). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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To determine whether a matter is of local, mixed state and local, or 
statewide concern, the supreme court applies a totality of the circum-
stances test that considers four factors: (1) the necessity of uniformity in 
regulation across the state, (2) the impact the local regulation will have on 
other areas of Colorado, (3) whether the matter has traditionally been reg-
ulated by local or state governments, and (4) whether the Colorado consti-
tution specifies the matter as an issue of state or local regulation.17 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HOLD THAT COLORADO SPRINGS' 
LOCAL ORDINANCE ALLOWING THE DISPOSITION OF THE OPEN SPACE 
SUPERSEDES THE STATE STATUTE REQUIRING AN ELECTION. 
The court of appeals should hold in favor of the City on this issue. 
An application of the four-factor totality of the circumstances test shows 
that the disposition is a matter of local concern and thus that the local or-
dinance supersedes the state statute, thereby allowing the trade without an 
election. Because there is some question as to whether consideration of the 
fourth factor may render consideration of the other three factors unneces-
sary, the analysis begins out of order with the fourth factor. 
A. The fourth factor weighs in favor of the City, because the Colorado 
constitution specifically provides home rule cities with the power to 
acquire and dispose of real property. 
The fourth factor considers whether the Colorado constitution com-
mits a matter to the state or locality.18 Article XX, Section 1 of the Colo-
rado constitution specifically enumerates the power to acquire and “dis-
pose of” real property as a power of home-rule municipalities.19 Amicus 
curiae Colorado Municipal League argues that the analysis of whether a 
matter is of local concern is unnecessary when the Colorado constitution 
grants a municipality a specific power.20 As the Colorado Municipal 
League contends, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that no state stat-
ute can deny any rights the Colorado constitution grants, and an analysis 
of statewide and local interests is unnecessary when a state statute purports 
to deny such a right.21 In this case, the Colorado constitution has clearly 
and specifically granted home-rule municipalities the power to dispose of 
real property,22 and thus no analysis of interests should be necessary. For 
this reason alone the court of appeals should end its analysis here and hold 
in favor of the City on this issue. 
  
 17. Id. at 580. 
 18. Id. 
 19. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1. 
 20. Brief of Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League in Support of Defendants/Appellees at 
13–15, Save Cheyenne v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 17CA0043 (Colo. App. Jul. 31, 2017) [hereinafter 
Brief of Amicus Curiae]. 
 21. Id. (citing Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 169–70 (Colo. 
2008)). 
 22. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1. 
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However, the Colorado Supreme Court in an earlier decision also 
stated that whether the Colorado constitution commits a matter to the state 
or a locality is “not dispositive.”23 The court stated that when the Colorado 
constitution commits a power to home-rule cities “in a general way,” then 
the matter is not necessarily “strictly local.”24 However, an argument that 
the Colorado constitution only commits the power to dispose of property 
to local governments in a “general way” should not persuade the court of 
appeals. The Colorado constitution is very specific when it states that 
home-rule municipalities “may purchase, receive, hold, and enjoy or sell 
and dispose of, real and personal property.”25  
Save Cheyenne also attempts to dodge the constitutional question en-
tirely by arguing that requiring elections does not interfere with the City’s 
constitutional power to dispose of real property but rather “simply inserts 
a procedural requirement.”26 The court of appeals should not find this ar-
gument persuasive, as a restriction on an ability to dispose of property 
without fulfilling a statutory requirement necessarily interferes with a 
power to dispose of property.  
Even if the court of appeals does not end its analysis at this factor, it 
should find that this factor weighs in favor of the City. The Colorado con-
stitution specifically commits the matter of disposal of property to home-
rule municipalities, making it matter of local concern.27 
B. The first factor weighs slightly in favor of Save Cheyenne, because 
uniformity in regulation helps achieve the state goal of protecting 
land. 
The first factor considers a need for uniformity of regulation 
statewide.28 The Colorado Supreme Court has said that uniformity is not 
desirable for its own sake but rather is necessary “when it achieves and 
maintains specific state goals.”29 The Colorado General Assembly has 
stated that one of its goals is the protection of public land: “The protection 
of the utility, value, and future of all lands within the state, including the 
public domain . . . is a matter of public interest.”30 Because an election 
gives voters the opportunity to preserve public lands that might otherwise 
be disposed of, it is clear how C.R.S. § 31-15-317 could further this goal. 
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of Save Cheyenne and indicates that the 
  
 23. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1284 (Colo. 2002). 
 24. Id. 
 25. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1. 
 26. Oral argument at 1:04:38, Save Cheyenne v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 17CA0043 (Colo. 
App. argued Jan. 9, 2018), https://cojudicial.ompnetwork.org/shows/16ca1383-17ca0043. 
 27. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1. 
 28. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016). 
 29. Id. (quoting City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 160 (Colo. 2003)). 
 30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-101 (2017). 
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matter of property disposal is at least a matter of mixed state and local 
concern. 
However, while it is clear how C.R.S. § 31-15-317 could further the 
stated goal, it is not clear why C.R.S. § 31-15-317 is necessary to achieve 
and maintain that goal. Indeed, in this case, without an election, the City 
is gaining much more public space than it loses.31 Thus, this factor only 
weighs slightly in favor of Save Cheyenne. 
C. The second factor weighs in favor of the City, because the City’s local 
ordinances about land disposal have no ripple effect. 
The second factor considers the impact of the local regulation outside 
the municipality. To satisfy this factor, the Court looks for a “ripple effect” 
with “serious consequences” on people outside the municipality.32 In City 
of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, the court found that the enactment 
of a fracking ban in Longmont could create a “ripple effect,” because the 
ban could encourage other municipalities to enact similar bans and ulti-
mately create a statewide ban.33 
No ripple effect is likely here. The fact that the City has not required 
an election before disposing of property is not likely to encourage other 
cities to adopt similar procedures. A survey of thirty-one home-rule mu-
nicipalities in Colorado shows that twenty-six do not require an election 
before the disposal of property, but five do require such an election.34 The 
existence of the City’s ordinance is unlikely to encourage the five who do 
require an election to drop that requirement. Therefore, this factor weighs 
in favor of the City and this matter being one of local concern. 
D. The third factor weighs in favor of the City, because local govern-
ments have traditionally regulated land use issues. 
The third factor considers whether the matter has traditionally been 
in the domain of state or local government.35 The Colorado Supreme Court 
recognizes that the use of zoning authority to control land use within a 
home-rule city is a matter of local concern.36 The Local Government Land 
Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 gave local governments, including 
those that were not home rule, a great amount of authority to plan for and 
regulate their land.37 Since land-use control has typically been in the do-
main of local government, this factor weighs in favor of the City and this 
matter being one of local concern. 
  
 31. Land Swap Approved, supra note 6. 
 32. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581 (quoting Ibarra, 62 P.3d at 161). 
 33. Id. at 581. 
 34. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 20, at 18–19. 
 35. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 580. 
 36. Id. at 581; Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Colo. 1992). 
 37. Voss, 830 P.2d at 1065 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-101 to -107 (2017)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Colorado Court of Appeals should find on the basis of the four-
factor test that the disposal of municipal lands is a matter of local concern. 
A local ordinance of a home-rule municipality addressing the disposal of 
municipality-owned real property should thus supersede C.R.S. § 31-15-
317. Colorado Springs’ ordinance that allows for the trade of the Straw-
berry Fields property to a private entity should not be superseded by C.R.S. 
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